Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems
Article Abstract:
House allocation problems were addressed through the use of a newly formulated matching mechanism called random serial dictatorship. Unlike simple serial dictatorships, random serial dictatorship prevents discrimination between agents through random determination of the ordering process. The new mechanism acts almost the same as the core from random endowments in terms of selecting lottery mechanisms for house allocation problems.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1998
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Achieving semiparametric efficiency bounds in left-censored duration models
Article Abstract:
The left-censoring problem emerges in the estimation of unemployment duration when overestimation generates variance in the duration. One solution to the problem is the introduction of a conditional maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) that considers the duration variable. However, such a conditional factor must coincide with a semiparametric MLE to achieve an efficiency bound.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1996
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