Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players

Article Abstract:

A finite supergame of an asymmetric Cournot duopoly was examined by subjecting experienced participants in a 20-period supergame in the Bonn laboratory of experimental economics. The participants used the strategy method, a system wherein subjects are able to form strategies based on their experiences from repeated games. After three programming rounds, a pattern was observed. There were no expectations established and there was nothing to be optimized. A fairness criteria was set to ascertain cooperative goals. It was concluded that regular strategies were likely to successful.

Duopolies

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An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication

Article Abstract:

Pre-play communication are statements made prior to the start of two-player games that do not directly influence the payoff functions. However, they play a major part in the game process because they provide information to all the players about their opponents' rationality. Such information may help players in choosing which strategies to adopt mid-way through the game. In addition, they help players achieve Nash equilibrium particularly during cases wherein there is little conflict of interest.

Decision-making, Decision making, Adaptability (Psychology)

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Pure strategy dominance

Article Abstract:

An analysis of Bayesian method applications to rationality under nonformal game conditions is presented. The analysis assumes that strategic and nonstrategic uncertainty are considered with similar bases on standard decisiontheory. It is shown that rational players choose a strategy which maximizes utility when other players do not exhibit dominant strategies. Pure and mixed strategies must be considered for the conditions to hold true.

Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis

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