Efficiency does not imply immediate agreement
Article Abstract:
Certain conclusions show that Faruk Gul's claim that the payoffs of efficient stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibria are close to the Shapley value, when the discount factor is close to one. For instance, the rho Pareto is dominant over tau for any game with a maximum of four players. The difference delta:= E(sub tau)(W)-E(sub rho)(W) can be expressed as a linear combination of the worths v(S). These are coalitions of S that has exactly one of one and two have positive coefficients. Coalitions that does not have one or two have negative coefficients.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1999
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The Nash bargaining theory with non-convex problems
Article Abstract:
The bargaining theory proposed by Nash is modified to account for non-convex problems and to eliminate the convexity restriction from his original theorem. The drawback of his theorem is that it is not valid for single-valued bargaining solutions when non-convex bargaining problems are considered. An n-person bargaining problem developed to remove the convexity is symbolized by a pair (S,d). S is a subset of R" while d is an interior point of S. Bargaining solutions which satisfy three axioms are discussed and analyzed.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1997
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Bargaining and value
Article Abstract:
Cost and benefit distribution within a bargaining model of n individuals is examined. The model allows partial cooperation by participants where a final result will not include all members of the cooperative endeavor. The transferable utility case is established as a cooperative solution in the Shapley value, while a Nash bargaining solution is found in the pure bargaining process.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1996
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