Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets
Article Abstract:
An analysis of the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets in the context of idealizations in large economies reveals that the two do not necessarily converge no matter how ideal the factors may be. Models with a continuum of agents are thought of as ideal factors in Mas-Colell bargaining sets and Zhou bargaining sets tend to set limitations in the Mas-Colell and these limitations are shown to be non-convergent regardless of the factors.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1997
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Cheap talk and sequential equilibria in signaling games
Article Abstract:
A convergence method is used to evaluate the feasibility of using cheap talk to provide signaling games with sequential equilibria. Results show that the addition of cheap talk to signaling games generates a sequential equilibrium outcome. This finding supports the hypothesis that future outcomes in signaling games can be used as measures for predicting possible responses.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1996
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