On "Reputation" refinements with heterogeneous beliefs
Article Abstract:
Reputation results on repeated games with incomplete information wherein long run players faces a sequence of short run opponents, was the subject of a commentary about which reputations are effective in a particular setting. The analysis focused on the probability that weak rationalizability and restrictions on the beliefs of players had something to do with the standard reputation results. The study showed the necessity of assuming that the conditional beliefs of the short run players satisfy a stochastic independence property, and also showed that reputation results hold on a weak rationalizability setting where both players are long run players.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1997
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Strategic experimentation
Article Abstract:
An experiment on the development of strategy is made in the form of a game. Strategy is developed by learning from the mistakes of others and learning when and when not to divulge important information. A balance is maintained between equilibrium experimentation and socially optimal experimentation. Prospective future experimentation by other players encourages other agents to increase the frequency of experimentation. The free-rider effect and the encouragement effect are predicted to elicit simultaneous responses.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1999
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A "reputation" refinement without equilibrium
Article Abstract:
An analysis of agents' reputations and information theory is presented. The analysis describes earlier research results wherein incomplete information generated equilibrium conditions different from those of complete information games. It is shown that incomplete information may refine the equilibrium set. In addition, agents may establish significant reputations without need for equilibrium conditions.
Publication Name: Econometrica
Subject: Mathematics
ISSN: 0012-9682
Year: 1993
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