Empathy and universalizability
Article Abstract:
Psychopaths are able to make moral judgments, yet seem to lack conscience or moral feelings. Such cases thus pose a problem in ascribing moral responsibility. The psychopath fails to exhibit mature empathy, which might be due to either stunted development or regression to egocentrism. Such regression may be caused by an inability to handle interpersonal conflicts. An inability to tolerate disharmony in interpersonal affairs as a fact of human psychology would support internalism of categorical imperatives, that judgments of what ought to be done are internally related to motives to act accordingly and feelings of remorse at any failure to do so.
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1995
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Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator
Article Abstract:
Hume's account of sympathy refers to cognitive processes, but more recent empirical research suggests that empathy develops through noncognitive processes. These include a tendency to mimic facial expressions, association of motor responses and emotions, and mimicry of gaze direction. Based on these empathetic processes, the ability to explain and predict the behavior of others is developed. A mechanism of containment must also operate to keep the emotions ascribed to others separate from one's own. However, moral evaluation requires placing certain limits on one's identification with the other person to preserve independent judgment.
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1995
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Thomson on distress
Article Abstract:
The distinction between belief-mediated and non-belief-mediated distress proposed by Judith Jarvis Thomson is valid, but it does not capture the type of distress that constitutes an infringement of rights, as she suggests. Causing some forms of belief-mediated distress may violate a person's rights, while causing others, such as moral indignation, would not. Thomson proposes the distinction because belief-mediated distress can be irrational or can be guarded against, but this does not mean that causing any type of belief-mediated distress is not an infringement.
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1995
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
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