| RAND Journal of Economics 1995 |
| Title | Subject | Authors |
|---|
| A comparison of public policies for lead recycling. | Economics | Sigman, Hilary A. |
| Adoption of technologies with network effects: an empirical examination of the adoption of automated teller machines. | Economics | Saloner, Garth, Shepard, Andrea |
| An economic analysis of scrappage. | Economics | Hahn, Robert W. |
| Antitrust and higher education: was there a conspiracy to restrict financial aid? | Economics | Carlton, Dennis W., Bamberger, Gustavo E., Epstein, Roy J. |
| Behind the revolving door: a new view of public utility regulation. | Economics | Salant, David J. |
| Benefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms.(Agency Relationships) | Economics | Hubbard, R. Glenn, Palia, Darius |
| Bid rigging and the threat of government prosecution. | Economics | LaCasse, Chantale |
| Buying frenzies and seller-induced excess demand. | Economics | DeGraba, Patrick |
| Competition over price and service rate when demand is stochastic: a strategic analysis. | Economics | Peck, James, Deneckere, Raymond |
| Continuous approximations in the study of hierarchies. | Economics | Van Zandt, Timothy |
| Contractual contingencies and renegotiation. | Economics | Dewatripont, M., Maskin, E. |
| Costly distortion of information in agency problems. | Economics | Maggi, Giovanni, Rodriguez-Clare, Andres |
| Costly verification of cost performance and the competition for incentive contracts. | Economics | Dunne, Stephanie A., Loewenstein, Mark A. |
| Determinants of participation in accelerated vehicle-retirement programs. | Economics | Harrington, Winston, Alberini, Anna, McConnell, Virginia |
| Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts.(Agency Relationships) | Economics | Lafontaine, Francine, Bhattacharyya, Sugato |
| Electoral support and the capture of legislators: evidence from North Carolina's vote on radioactive waste disposal. | Economics | Coates, Dennis |
| Endogenous structures of association in oligopolies. | Economics | Bloch, Francis |
| Fault, settlement, and negligence law. | Economics | Kessler, Daniel |
| Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts. | Economics | Mookherjee, Dilip, Reichelstein, Stefan, Melumad, Nahum D. |
| Innovation and natural resources: a dynamic game with uncertainty. | Economics | Vickers, John, Harris, Christopher |
| Keeping society in the dark: on the admissibility of pretrial negotiations as evidence in court. | Economics | Daughety, Andrew F., Reinganum, Jenifer F. |
| Limit qualities and entry deterrence. | Economics | Weber, Shlomo, Donnenfeld, Shabtai |
| Linearity with project selection and controllable diffusion rate in continuous-time principal-agent problems. | Economics | Sung, Jaeyoung |
| Managed care as a public cost-containment mechanism. | Economics | Goldman, Dana P. |
| Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships. | Economics | Gertler, Paul, Gaynor, Martin |
| On productivity and plant ownership change: new evidence from the Longitudinal Research Database. | Economics | McGuckin, Robert H., Nguyen, Sang V. |
| On the division of profit in sequential innovation. | Economics | Scotchmer, Suzanne, Green, Jerry R. |
| On the efficiency of privately stipulated damages for breach of contract: entry barriers, reliance, and renegotiation. | Economics | Spier, Kathryn E., Whinston, Michael D. |
| Optimal capital structure in agency relationships. | Economics | Sappington, David E.M., Lewis, Tracy R. |
| Optimal incentive schemes when only the agents' "best" output matters to the principal.(Agency Relationships) | Economics | Levitt, Steven D. |
| Option contracts and renegotiation: a solution to the hold-up problem. | Economics | Noldeke, Georg, Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| Overt interfunctional conflict (and its reduction through business strategy). | Economics | Rotemberg, Julio J., Saloner, Garth |
| Partnerships as insurance devices: theory and evidence. | Economics | Lang, Kevin, Gordon, Peter-John |
| Patent scope, antitrust policy, and cumulative innovation. | Economics | Chang, Howard F. |
| Product and process flexibility in an innovative environment. | Economics | Athey, Susan, Schmutzler, Armin |
| Regulating a dominant firm: unknown demand and industry structure. | Economics | Biglaiser, Gary, Ma, Ching-to Albert |
| Regulating complementary products: a comparative institutional analysis. | Economics | Gilbert, Richard J., Riordan, Michael H. |
| Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion. | Economics | Che, Yeon-Koo |
| Testing for employer monopsony in turn-of-the-century coal mining. | Economics | Boal, William M. |
| Testing for imperfect competition at the Fulton fish market. (New York City) | Economics | Graddy, Kathryn |
| The competitive effects of mergers: stock market evidence from the U.S. Steel dissolution suit. | Economics | Mullin, Wallace P., Mullin, George L., Mullin, Joseph C. |
| The role of exclusive territories in producers' competition. | Economics | Stiglitz, Joseph E., Rey, Patrick |
| Trade-ins and introductory offers in a monopoly. | Economics | Ackere, Ann van, Reyniers, Diane J. |
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