What price fairness? A bargaining study

Article Abstract:

The bargaining behavior of individuals has been found to be influenced by the degree of strategic advantage and the favoured party's fairness perception. A study involving 302 male and female students at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology showed that the level of willingness manifested by an individual with a strong bargaining position tend to be high if the risk at stake is relatively low. The same is true for individuals confronted with smaller material cost sacrifice. Empirical results further prove that low-cost players tend to exploit cost advantages to acquire strategic power but the degree of exploitation is dependent on the cost of rejection. The study also confirmed the assumption that proportion of disadvantageous counter-offers made by a disadvantaged player follows an indirect pattern.

Management Theory & Techniques, Overhead costs, Fairness

---

Asymmetric players and bargaining for profit shares in natural resource development

Article Abstract:

Natural resource development agreements depend on the relative bargaining power levels of host country governments and multinational corporations or agents. Share contracts are emphasized in which a part of net firm income from resource development is given to the government. It is shown that as the number of agents increases, the governments receive a higher share. When either player is capable of threatening the other, the threatening party is found to receive a larger share. Host governments that share in production expenses also tend to receive greater shares.

International business enterprises, Multinational corporations, Natural resources, Gambling, Resource allocation

---

Dynamic bargaining with transaction costs

Article Abstract:

The bargaining process involves making offers and counteroffers until the buyer and the seller reach an agreement or until one of the parties ceases to negotiate. Strategic bargaining is characterized by impatience to strike a deal which stems from the trader's consideration of future payoffs and the transaction bargaining costs. The amount of gains from trade and the relative costs of bargaining determine whether, in equilibrium, there will be immediate trade, delayed trade, or immediate termination of transactions.

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: The outlook for United States corporate earnings. Savings with a formal forecasting system. A case study of two forecasting organizational options
• Abstracts: Japanese management: coping with British industrial relations. Industrialization, management education and training systems: a comparative analysis
• Abstracts: The role of productive thinking in affecting student learning with microcomputers in accounting education. Evaluation of teaching techniques for introductory accounting courses
• Abstracts: The symbolic impact of double bind leadership: double bind and the dynamics of organizational culture. The effects of goal emphasis on performance on a complex task
• Abstracts: Innovative and noninnovative small firms: types and characteristics. On the minimum of a nonconvex inventory function

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.