Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences

Article Abstract:

A theoretical study is conducted to analyze the horizontal merger of firms using the standard models of Cournot competition. The results showed that any profitable merger failing to generate technological synergies, raised prices and harmed consumers, irrespective of entry conditions and the presence of fixed costs.

Scientific Research and Development Services, Development, Economic Programs-Total Govt, Administration of Economic Programs, Evaluation, Economic development, Technological innovations

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Should alternative mergers or acquisitions be considered by antitrust authorities

Article Abstract:

A study examining the benefits of considering alternative mergers when analyzing the effects of a proposed merger may provide some information to the antitrust authorities is presented.

Portugal, Make-or-buy decisions, Make or buy decisions

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On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control

Article Abstract:

The role of efficiency defense in merger control procedures is analyzed. Lobbying, rent seeking, asymmetric information, etc. are also explained elaborately.

Europe, Lobbying, Control, Asynchronous communications, Asynchronous transfer mode, ATM

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