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Business, international

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Moral hazard and reputational concerns in teams: implications for organizational choice

Article Abstract:

The reputation model developed by Fama and Holmstrom is used to examine the impact of market reputation on moral hazard in the context of joint production. Two organizational issues, sharing team output among agents and grouping agents in teams, are also examined. Results reveal the existence of several factors needed to create an efficient team organization and eliminate the free-rider problem. These include pay incentives and cooperation.

Author: Jeon, Seonghoon
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1996
Organizational effectiveness, Organizational research

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Moral hazard with several agents: the gains from cooperation

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to evaluate economic conditions which prevail when a principal employs two commercial agents. The study assumes that the agents are cooperative and exhibit varying degrees of cooperation. Results show that the level of agent cooperation conditions the development of an optimal contract. In addition, more cooperation generates more efficient results for the principal in equilibrium.

Author: Macho-Stadler, Ines, Perez-Castrillo, J. David
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1993
Economic aspects, Commercial agents, Industrial cooperation

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Learning about a population of agents and the evolution of trust and cooperation

Article Abstract:

A proposed determinant to existing reputation models deals with uncertainty and knowing the population of agents from which particular agents are chosen. Findings suggest that the extent of agents' cooperation and principals' trust depends on the past behavior of other agents in the population. Trust and cooperation then change depending on the principal's beliefs regarding the population of agents.

Author: Garber, Steven, Bower, Anthony G., Watson, Joel C.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Subject: Business, international
ISSN: 0167-7187
Year: 1997
Game theory, Agency (Law), Trust (Psychology), Reputation (Law), Reputation

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Subjects list: Models, Analysis
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