Bank governance in the Japanese economic system

Article Abstract:

A survey of governance systems in Japanese banks reveals that managers are more or less independent from stockholder control, that these managers are motivated by expansion of activities, that the main government control comes in the form of competition stifling policies and that franchise value has no significant effect on bank behavior. The future of the Japanese banking industry will be dependent on the outcomes of changes in Japanese style employment, cross-shareholding and future prospects of the industrial coordination system.

Economic aspects, Japan

---

Branch manager turnover and lending efficiency: local vs. national banks

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the effects of managerial turnover on lending efficiency reveals that increased turnover times result in decreased lending efficiency. The study notes that increased managerial turnover persists as banks seek to avoid the moral hazard problem posed by increased manager stays in an area. The study concludes that courts should be made more efficient in resolving bad loans and that banks should come up with other measures other than managerial turnover to counter the moral hazard problem.

Loans, Business economics, Managerial economics

---

Bank governance: models and reality

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the practical applications of the models of corporate governance for banks reveals that the establishment of auditor boards that guard the interest of the minority is needed as is diminished family-based capitalism and deregulation. These factors comprise a radical reorganization mentality that the Italian banking industry needs to survive in the rapidly evolving financial market.

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Banks and governance in transition economies. Competition and corporate governance: the case of Italian banks

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.