A solution to hold-up problem involving gradual investment

Article Abstract:

The hold-up problem in a business contract where a seller provides a buyer with an investment benefiting the buyer who has control over the benefit of investment, and where the contracts over investment and trade are fully incomplete, is discussed. A game, which provides a perfect solution for the problem by involving investments by installments by the supplier and reimbursement by the buyer after each installment is analyzed.

Buyers (Retail), Buy-sell agreements

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Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics

Article Abstract:

A study on excess payoff dynamics, using model of evolution in games, is presented. In evolution models agents get opportunities to change strategies, using a probabilistic rule. Both, the revision with which the opportunities are obtained and probabilities of choosing a strategy together make up the excess payoffs dynamics.

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"Very Nice" trivial equilibria in strategic market games

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the trivial equilibrium, a type of Nash Equilibrium, in strategic market games is presented.

Italy, Equilibrium (Economics)

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