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A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed: comment

Article Abstract:

Varian's (1994) simpler version of the compensation mechanism (CM2) does not establish unique outcomes and the successful outcomes are not included in the set of the probable equilibrium outcomes for particular conditions of externality problems such as the prisoner's dilemma payoffs. Varian introduced the first version of the two-stage game for solving externality problems, compensation mechanism (CM1), as an efficient method for a general class of externality problems.

Author: Ziss, Steffen
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1997
Models, Economic aspects, Externalities (Economics), Prisoner's dilemma game

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Is there a free-rider problem in lobbying? endogenous tariffs, trigger strategies, and the number of firms

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the free-rider problem in lobbying reveals that a trigger strategy is a simple monitoring technology suitable for monitoring free rider occurrence. However, the study reveals that the trigger strategy is strongly at odds about how increases in the number of firms in an industry affects the probability of the free-rider problem in tariff lobbying and that the results may not be robust to the introduction of certain types of informational imperfections.

Author: Pecorino, Paul
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1998
Analysis, Finance, Campaign funds, Lobbying, Political action committees

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Strategic behavior in contests: comment

Article Abstract:

The existence of local commitment incentives in symmetric contests was confirmed through the application of the Nash equilibrium concept in evaluating strategic behavior. Local commitment incentives are particularly prevalent in conditions where the magnitude of a third derivative of the contest success function is high. Such an assumption may also be applied in contests where player efforts are not concave, including the Tullock rent-seeking game.

Author: Baye, Michael R., Shin, Onsong
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1999
Research, Equilibrium (Economics), Games of strategy (Mathematics)

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Subjects list: Economics
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