An evolutionary model of bargaining

Article Abstract:

An evolutionary model of bargaining is developed and analyzed. The model defines individuals from two bargainer populations and matches them up randomlyfor a Nash demand game. These individuals make their demands on the basis of incomplete information and occasional random choices. It is shown that a stochastically stable division is generated which approximates Nash equilibriumconditions.

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Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game

Article Abstract:

The 'reputation effect' has a strong influence in bargaining games that use asymmetric information. This effect allows sellers to establish product price minimums based on the sellers' maximum costs. Previous research of the reputation effect is also discussed.

Game theory

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Excess demand functions with incomplete markets - a global result

Article Abstract:

The author looks at international aspects of excess demand functions.

Japan, Science & research, World market, International markets

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