An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations

Article Abstract:

A direct approach to non-cooperative foundations is presented. The method disentangles the procedural rules of bargaining from modeling primitives by explicit modeling of preferences and outcomes, formulating cooperative solutions and defining negotiation rules. It is argued that the goal of non-cooperative foundations of providing credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation can be best achieved through the construction of game forms and explicit modeling of the physical environment and individual preferences.

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Bargaining in a long-term relationship with endogenous termination

Article Abstract:

A bargaining model characterized by perfect information is discussed. In this particular situation, two players endlessly bargain and negotiate. The negotiations follow the rules set by Rubinstein in his alternating-offers theory. Incorporated in the model are such determinants as the rates of time preference of the bargaining parties, the length of time it takes between two successive offers and the time incurred for one particular set of bargaining activity to end and for another to start.

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A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic

Article Abstract:

Bargainers usually enter into implied partial commitments when employing bargaining strategies. A one-shot, simultaneous-move bargaining model indicates that the bargainer's willingness to trade benefits depends solely on the potential and accepted share of the bargaining benefits. This dependency on marginal cost of revoking the partial commitments indicates a efficient Nash equilibrium. The model is partly based on Schelling's essay on bargaining and Crawford's bargaining model.

Economic aspects, Equilibrium (Economics), Commitment (Psychology)

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