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Anomalous behavior in a traveler's dilemma?

Article Abstract:

The traveler's dilemma concept popularized by Kaushik Basu has drawn the interest of economic analysts and social experts, as it defies certain provisions of the Nash equilibrium. Application of Nash prediction principles would prove inefficient in addressing the problem since it utilizes average claims that are inversely related to the penalty/reward parameter. The problem may be addressed throigh the adoption of a logit equilibrium model, which determines decision through the use of probabilistic choice functions.

Author: Goeree, Jacob K., Holt, Charles A., Capra, C. Monica, Gomez, Rosario
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1999
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Decision-making, Models, Decision making, Analysis, Economic research

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An experimental test of equilibrium dominance in signaling games

Article Abstract:

Signaling games can model several economic conditions characterized by asymmetric information. Sequential, 'unintuitive' equilibria can be found in even simple signaling games. Research was conducted to assess equilibrium dominance, which has led to several of the refinements of the concept of sequentiality. The results suggested that characteristics of the adjustment process should be the basis of a positive theory of equilibrium choice in games.

Author: Holt, Charles A., Brandts, Jordi
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1992
Research, Economic aspects, Game theory, Information measurement

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A change would do you good...an experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Article Abstract:

The use of financial incentives for controlling organizational co-ordination failures is discussed.

Author: Cooper, David J., Brandts, Jordi
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 2006
United States, Management dynamics, Management, Usage, Employee incentives, Organizational effectiveness, Company business management

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Subjects list: Equilibrium (Economics)
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