Arrovian aggregation in economic environment: how much should we know about indifferences

Article Abstract:

The results of an investigation done to know how much information about in difference surfaces are needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity in the standard model with reference to Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choices are presented.

Scientific Research and Development Services, Development, Economic Programs-Total Govt, Administration of Economic Programs, Economic development, Set theory, Fuzzy sets

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Characterizations of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism

Article Abstract:

A consequentialist and a nonconsequentialist, who show contrasting attiduces toward alternatives vis-a-vis opportunities, are identified in terms of some axioms. The concept of an extreme consequentialist and a strong consequentialist are defined and characterize axiomatically.

Economics, Economic theory

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Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism

Article Abstract:

This generalization of a previous article allows consequences and nonconsequences to interact and includes alternatives w hether infinite or finite.

Science & research, Research, Decision-making, Decision making, Economic aspects

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