Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior

Article Abstract:

The effects of disclosure of managerial compensation on consumer welfare are analyzed. The bargaining process over the managerial compensation toughens product market competition and increases consumer surplus. The impacts of the executive renumeration transparency policy and the cartel behavior on consumer surplus are examined further.

Contracts & orders received, Personnel administration, Contracts & orders let, Economic aspects, Compensation and benefits, Contracts, Managers, Contract agreement, Disclosure of information, Report

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R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note

Article Abstract:

A study makes a critical analysis of the works of Zhang and Zhang regarding delegation of decision making authority by business owners to managers on production.

Austria, Production management, Management-Delegation, Venture Analysis, Decision-making, Decision making, Analysis, Business enterprises, Delegation of authority

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Delegation in First-price All-pay auctions

Article Abstract:

Then difference between delegating bidding decision to agents by buyers and the first-price all-pay auctions are examined.

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