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Benefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms

Article Abstract:

The effect of benefits to managers of corporate control on the relationship between managerial ownership and stock returns of acquiring firms is investigated. Managers in acquiring firms engage in non-value-maximizing activities at low levels of managerial ownership, while managers' interest become more aligned with those of shareholders at high levels of managerial ownership. A nonmonotonic relationship was noted between stock returns of acquirers and their level of managerial ownership.

Author: Hubbard, R. Glenn, Palia, Darius
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1995
Investments, Stockholders, Employee ownership

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Executive pay and performance: evidence from the US banking industry

Article Abstract:

The link between executive pay and deregulation on corporate performance in 147 banks during the 1980s was investigated. Specifically, it was shown that CEO compensation and turnover increases and 'stronger pay-performance relation' occurs in deregulated markets which permit interstate banking. These suggest the existence of an executive talent market which balances the 'the level and structure of pay' with banking competitiveness.

Author: Hubbard, R. Glenn, Palia, Darius
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1995
Banking industry, Compensation and benefits, Executive compensation, Deregulation

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Corporate financial policy, taxation, and macroeconomic risk

Article Abstract:

An analysis of equityfunction under uncertainty conditions is presented. It is shown that equity presents firms a shield by which they can counter aggregate fluctuations. In addition, equity allows them to spread the risk by sharing it with their creditors. These results support the possibility that firm dividends vary on a macroeconomic basis when relevant factors are controlled.

Author: Hubbard, R. Glenn, Gertler, Mark
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1993
Analysis, Finance, Risk (Economics), Corporations, Taxation, Corporate finance, Equity (Law)

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Subjects list: Research, Executives, Economic aspects
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