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The performance of investment newsletters

Article Abstract:

The recommendations of common stocks made by newsletters and followed by Hulbert Financial Digest were analyzed. Hulbert maintains a database of all the recommendations it has received that is not subject to hindsight or other biases because of the real-time failure. Results show that the future performance of a newsletter is related to its past performance when performance is calculated by raw returns. However, when performance is calculated by abnormal returns, persistence vanishes. Therefore, the performance of newsletters does not exhibit persistence.

Author: Jaffe, Jeffrey F., Mahoney, James M.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1999
All Other Publishers, Miscellaneous publishing, Business Newsletters, Reports, Investment analysis, Securities analysis, Investment advisory newsletters, Investment newsletters, Hulbert Financial Digest (Periodical)

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Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover

Article Abstract:

Managerial compensation tends to be influenced by the two contrasting effects of a corporate takeover threat. An analysis of a sample of about 450 large companies showed that the competition effect of a high takeover threat brings a reduction of about $22,800 to $211,600 in the salary and bonus of an average chief executive officer (CEO). On the other hand, the risk effect of a high takeover threat brings an increase of about $41,500 to $255,300 in an average CEO's salary and bonus.

Author: Agrawal, Anup, Knoeber, Charles R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1998
Management Compensation, Economic aspects, Acquisitions and mergers, Compensation management, Executive compensation

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Does Section 16b deter insider trading by target managers?

Article Abstract:

An examination of mergers and acquisitions undertaken between 1941 and 1961 shows that insider purchases declined as a likely result of the prohibitions contained in Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act, which is otherwise known as the short-swing rule. This decline was observed generally to occur before the announcement of mergers and before the completion date. This trend, however, was not observed in the case of sales.

Author: Agrawal, Anup, Jaffe, Jeffrey F.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1995
Insider trading in securities, Insider trading (Securities)

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