Caps on political lobbying

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the effects of imposing caps on political lobbying finance reveals that an exogenous cap on all-pay auction bids weakly reduces a high valuation bidder's chances of winning. The study also reveals that caps also may have a perverse effect on increasing aggregate contributions while lowering total surplus as results show that limits on individual expenditures may increase total expenditures and limit total surplus.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Analysis, Finance, Auctions, Political action committees

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Caps on political lobbying: comment

Article Abstract:

A study examines the impact of government limits on spending and lobbying in political and sport contests.

Control

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Caps on political lobbying: reply

Article Abstract:

A study examines the varying theories on imposing limits on expenditure in political lobbying.

Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Forecasts and trends, Market trend/market analysis

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