Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

Article Abstract:

An evaluation of competitive activities among traders offering auctions reveals that equilibria in prices exists and may be different under certain conditions. The study evaluates competitive advantage of one seller over the other under conditions where buyers know the price of the stock beforehand and under conditions wherein buyers have no prior knowledge of stock price. The efficiency of properties of the resulting equilibria shows major differences.

Sales Management NEC, Usage, Competitions, Statistics, Statistics (Data), Selling, Sales management

---

Tacit collusion in repeated auctions

Article Abstract:

The possibility of a collusion in repeated auctions through implicit transfers of equilibrium continuation payoffs is analyzed. It is observed that with a finite number of players, public observation of the winner's identity is only enough to sustain a certain amount of profitable collusion, but is enough to extract all of the surplus.

Collusion

---

Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency

Article Abstract:

The properties and dynamics of contracts satisfying renegotiation-proofness in a principal-agent framework are analyzed.

Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Forecasts and trends, Contracts, Market trend/market analysis, Agency (Law)

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Cointegration analysis of the expectations theory of the term structure. Effects of interest rate swaps
• Abstracts: General practitioners' choice of referral destination: a probit analysis. Predicting the geo-temporal variations of crime and disorder
• Abstracts: The role of innovation and opportunity in bilateral OECD trade performance
• Abstracts: Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Inefficient foreign borrowing: a dual- and common-agency perspective
• Abstracts: The effect of transaction costs on double auction markets. Bidding behavior in the price is right game: an experimental study

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.