Private monitoring in auctions

Article Abstract:

The impact of an auctioneer's withholding of information on the collusion among bidders participating in first-price auctions, within a repeated game environment, is analyzed. The bidders employ private strategies in such situations.

Germany, Forecasts, trends, outlooks, Management dynamics, Miscellaneous retail stores, not elsewhere classified, Art Dealers, Auctioneers, Art Dealers, Management, Usage, Forecasts and trends, Behavior, Influence, Market trend/market analysis, Company business management, Game theory, Purchasing agents, Auctioneers, Disclosure of information

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All equilibria of the Vickery auction

Article Abstract:

The Vickrey's second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders is evaluated. It is shown that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.

Evaluation

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