Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance

Article Abstract:

The connection between executive compensation and firm performance was studied by analyzing compensation statistics from 153 manufacturing entities for the period 1979-80. The concept of agency theory was included in the study since ownership structure is an important factor in firm performance. It was concluded that the percentages of executives' compensation based on equity were negatively related to their equity. Firms with more outsider board members were likely to implement compensation based on equity.

Corporate governance

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Capital budgeting and delegation

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to determine when one would expect owners to delegate the allocation of capital across projects supporting a given amount of capital. A model, wherein delegation is characterized as a way to save on investigation costs, was used. Results indicated that when projects are carried out sequentially, the delegation of allocation across projects can be characterized as allowing management to roll over capital from one period to the next.

Management Dynamics NEC, Analysis, Management research, Management techniques

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Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

Article Abstract:

Managerial compensation programs and capital allocation are studied with reference to the quality of the project that is under management. Higher performance-based pay may be the result of managing higher quality projects not because the project increases the value of the company.

Management Compensation

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