Fairness: effect on temporary and equilibrium prices in posted-offer markets

Article Abstract:

The tendency of consumers to resist price changes during sharp but perceptibly short-term changes in economic conditions is investigated. The value of fairness is usually postulated as the reason for such a consumer attitude. Within the context of a posted-market environment, such a theory is validated. Costs usually are above profits in the short-term but in the long run, equilibrium prices will hover near or at the competitive surplus maximizing level.

Pricing, Beliefs, opinions and attitudes, Consumers, Attitudes

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Neoclassical price theory, institutions, and the evolution of securities market organization

Article Abstract:

Marshallian and Walrasian theoretical approaches to equilibrium price determination are rooted in variant approaches to institutional and market organization. The dependence of market efficiency for an organization on the strength of monopoly trading disproved the notion of a natural evolution toward equilibrium conditions. Even technological innovations were not sufficient conditions for market variation.

Analysis, Neoclassical economics, Walrasian model

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