Finding and retaining the dominant strategy: the second-price, English and 'sealed offer' English auctions
Article Abstract:
Operation abilities of auctions, the second-price, English and 'sealed offer' english, are analyzed using experiments. Transfer of dominant strategy is evaluated.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2006
Analysis, Strategic planning (Business)
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2006
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All-pay auctionsuan experimental study
Article Abstract:
The usage of repeated all-pay auction game analyzing revenue equilibriums in organizational economics is presented.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2006
Evaluation, Revenue
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2006
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Subjects list: United States, Management, Company business management, Auctions
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