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Information, liquidity, and asset trading in a random matching game

Article Abstract:

The willingness to trade assets depends on the available informations regarding the assets' liquidity and rate of returns. These informations, which make some assets more tradeable than others, differ from agent to agent who use different trading strategies. Informed agents trade quality verifiable assets, which reduces the assets' payoff, while less informed agents are likely to trade less verifiable assets with lower liquidity but have higher payoffs. Thus, trading volume and rates of return of liquid assets are inversely related.

Author: Hopenhayn, Hugo A., Werner, Ingrid M.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Capital assets, Liquidity (Finance)

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Optimal information acquisition for heterogenous duopoly firms

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the information acquisition process for heterogenous duopoly firms is presented. The analysis focuses on such a market under stochastic conditions where firms encounter costs in acquiring market demand conditions. Comparison of equilibrium amounts of information acquired by each firm shows that costs are influenced by differential effects, uncertainty and demand and cost function indicators.

Author: Hwang, Hae-Shin
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1993
Duopolies

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Dealy in bargaining games with complete information

Article Abstract:

An analysis complete information bargaining games with delayconditions is presented. The analysis focuses on a two-person setting where continuous time, unrestricted offer orders and minimal delays are assumed. It is shown that multiple subgame-perfect equilibria which support delayed agreements are generated by simultaneous offers. Thus, such offers are necessary for establishing delay and non-uniqueness.

Author: Sakovics, Jozsef
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1993
Negotiation, Negotiations, Game theory

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Subjects list: Research, Economic aspects, Economics, Information theory, Information theory in economics
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