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Limited intertemporal commitment and job design

Article Abstract:

Optimal performance can be achieved by joint responsibility of tasks in a dynamic setting wherein intertemporal commitment is limited. Joint responsibility of tasks generates a weak ratchet effect, thereby, reducing the cost of optimal performance, and at the same time, allowing the principal to impose a uniform, but diverse lower-powered incentives. Such dynamic benefits, in reducing the impact of ratchet effects, make optimal grouping of tasks an effective job design.

Author: Olsen, Trond E., Meyer, Margaret A., Torsvik, Gaute
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1996
Productivity Improvement, Group Dynamics, Job Enrichment, Methods, Human resource management, Work groups, Teamwork (Workplace), Interpersonal relations, Labor productivity, Work design

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The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: a re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data

Article Abstract:

An analysis of B.M. Staw and associate's research on the National Basketball Assn (NBA) data was conducted. The objective was to examine the phenomenon of escalation of commitment by NBA teams to high-ranking players which was not justified by the subsequent performance of the players. A reexamination of the data revealed the persistence of the escalation theory and ruled out rational alternative explanations more effectively than previous studies did.

Author: Weber, Roberto A., Camerer, Colin F.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1999
Research, National Basketball Association, Commitment (Psychology), Staw, B.M.

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Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk

Article Abstract:

The usage of agency theories for analyzing employee incentives and performances is discussed.

Author: Ming Guo, Hui Ou-Yang
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2006
United States, Usage, Evaluation, Agency theory, Employee performance

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Subjects list: Analysis, Employee incentives
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