Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Economics

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Economics

Managerial objectives and firm dividend policy: a behavioral theory and empirical evidence

Article Abstract:

Some basic features of the behavioral theory of the firm can be applied to the development of a dynamic model of firm dividend policy. Uncertainty avoidance and sequential decision making by self-seeking managers were used to construct a decision-theoretic model. Empirical results from New York Stock Exchange dividend data were found to be supportive of predictions from the model. Current investment, dividend payouts and the return on capital as well as the variance and persistence of capital productivity shocks apparently have significant effect on the likelihood of future dividend changes.

Author: Kumar, Praveen, Cyert, Richard, Kang, Sok-Hyon
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1996
Dividends

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Impact of organizational structure on oligopolistic pricing

Article Abstract:

Organizational structure affects industrial price levels. Such structure defines market price direction to a competitive or a monopolistic standard. In certain oligopolistic situations, firms may adjust to non-price competition by creating secret price cuts to maintain market advantage. Thus, information plays a major role in a firm's response to price changes. However, such information is conditioned by the level of centralization present in the firm.

Author: Kumar, Praveen, Williams, Jeff, Cyert, Richard
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1995
Economic aspects, Pricing, Corporate culture, Oligopolies, Price cutting

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Moral hazard and contractibility in investment decisions

Article Abstract:

The incentive effects of moral hazard and contractibility during the first phase of a two-phase investment decision are investigated using a principal-agent framework. Over-investment is shown to occur in second-stage production where the intermediate signal is contractible and publicly observable, while the decision to under-invest occurs where the principal and agent act opportunistically.

Author: Mukherji, Arijit, Nagarajan, Nandu J.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1995
Psychological aspects, Investments, Incentive (Psychology)

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Research, Decision-making, Decision making, Organizational behavior
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: Inflation and the real price of equities: theory with some empirical evidence. On perfect foresight and uncertainty in economic models: two monetary examples
  • Abstracts: Fiscal policy, public debt stabilisation and politics: theory and UK evidence. Wage inflation, electoral uncertainty and the exchange rate regime: theory and UK evidence
  • Abstracts: Beyond "Miracles" and total factor productivity: the Singapore experience. The strategic dimension of the "East Asian Developmental States."
  • Abstracts: The optimal auction : a mechanism for optimal third-degree price discrimination. Uncertain contestability
  • Abstracts: The econometric analysis of economic policy. Multi-step estimation for forecasting
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2025 Advameg, Inc.