Marriage and divorce: comment

Article Abstract:

An attempt was made to replicate the results of H. Elizabeth Peters' 1986 study on the effect of divorce laws on divorce rates. Peters' findings suggested that the implementation of no-fault divorce laws had little effect on the divorce rate. The second study could not replicate the findings of the first study. The results of the second study indicated that divorce rates were higher in states with no-fault divorce laws. The inappropriate application of the Coase theorem may have contributed to the errors in Peters' study.

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Risk preferences and the economics of contracts

Article Abstract:

The application of risk aversion as an explanatory variable in theoretical contract models has not been supported by substantial evidence. The risk-neutral transaction-cost approach, which sets multiple margins to account for moral hazard and enforcement costs, exhibited greater application over risk-avoidance in evaluating contract design. In addition, risk aversion disregards the impact of other factors in contract development.

Risk assessment, Contracts

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Marriage and divorce: reply

Article Abstract:

A 1986 study shows that divorce rates do not increase significantly as a result of no-fault divorce laws. Theory suggests that unilateral divorce laws redefine which party can legally terminate a marriage, but these laws do not decrease the costs of divorce. Douglas Allen's 1992 study indicates that no-fault divorce laws increase the probability of divorce. These findings are not accurate because of omitted-variable bias.

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