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Modelling competitive behavior

Article Abstract:

A bargaining game model which explains the competitive behavior of sellers and buyers for a good is presented. The model posits a lone seller wanting to sell a good to one or many buyers. The components of impatience or the power to make price offers increases the strategic strength of the parties involved. The introduction of additional buyers or sellers increases the competitiveness of bargaining activities. The element of patience in bargaining tends to result in a Walrasian equilibrium and a condition of collusive equilibria could result from games with a limited number of players.

Author: Vincent, Daniel R.
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1992
Models, Price fixing, Competition (Psychology)

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Tariffying auctions

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to analyze a scheme of converting quotas to tariffs through the auctioning off the quota rights and the use of the realized auction prices as guides to establishing tariffs. The association between tariff-equivalents and auction prices for auctions with resale was examined. Results indicated that either auction prices may be understated or that aftermarket prices overstate the true tariff equivalent.

Author: McAfee, R. Preston, Vincent, Daniel R., Takacs, Wendy
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1999
Administration of General Economic Programs, Quotas & Import Controls, Tariffs & Quotas NEC, Analysis, Tariffs, Import quotas

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Endogenous structures of association in oligopolies

Article Abstract:

Firms in an oligopoly with linear demand form associations in a two-stage noncooperative game structure. In the initial stage, firms form associations to reduce costs and thus increase profits, while in the second stage, they behave as competitors on the market to maximize individual profits. Two features are prominent in the associations formed by oligopolistic firms, namely asymmetry and inefficiency.

Author: Bloch, Francis
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1995
Social networks, Oligopolies

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Subjects list: Research, Competition (Economics), Economic aspects
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