Paying for pollution: permits and charges

Article Abstract:

Rent capture policies for tradeable emission permits are examined to determine their efficiency and their impact on 'clean' and 'dirty' firms. These policies include a profit, an input, an output, and an emission permit rental charge. Results show that short-run emissions trading results of heterogeneous companies are distorted by input and output charges. Moreover, the policies are ranked depending on the pollution technology available.

Analysis, Emissions credit trading, Emissions trading

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Controlling stock externalities: flexible versus inflexible Pigovian corrections

Article Abstract:

A dynamic model showing the characteristics of Pigovian taxes utilized to correct stock externalities was presented. Examples of stock externalities are occurences of environmental degredation such as ozone layer depletion, global warming, topsoil depletion and ground water contamination. The Pigovian tax characteristics were examined as to adjustments costs and the effects on the environment of the timing of environmental corrections.

Research, Externalities (Economics), Tax expenditures

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Monopoly Versus Competition

Article Abstract:

The effect of learning-by-doing on prices and quantity is compared under monopolies and competition. Learning-by- doing affects a monopoly more than a competitive firm. The reduction of production cost may be faster under a monopoly.

Production management, Comparative analysis, Monopolies, Learning, Psychology of, Learning theory (Psychology)

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