Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium

Article Abstract:

The forecasting of equilibrium by players in a game is examined in detail. The usage of information by players in assessing their opponents' path is also examined.

Economic aspects

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Imitation processes with small mutations

Article Abstract:

The effect of addition of stochastic mutations to an imitation dynamics, which is a learning process, and the behavior of the resulting system are analyzed.

United States, Germany, Methods, Usage, Stochastic processes, Dynamical systems

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Learning purified mixed equilibria

Article Abstract:

Totally mixed equilibria are found to be stable for zero sum games, while there is generic instability for mixed equilibria where games are symmetric.

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