Privatization and x-inefficiency: a bargaining approach

Article Abstract:

A study presented an approach to public sector X-inefficiency based on bargaining with the assumption that effort is determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers do not want more effort because their utility is assumed to decrease. On the other hand, companies prefer more effort because it increases their productivity, and the bargain settles the differences between firms and workers. The model developed in the study predicts that privatization should increase effort and decrease X-inefficiency under certain conditions, with wages either increasing or decreasing.

Privatization, Privatization (Business), Public sector, Agency theory

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Do other firms matter in oligopolies?

Article Abstract:

Two conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the actual interaction that takes place between firms in an oligopoly. The first is that a firm's profits depend significantly on its own physical and financial characteristics as well as its competitors. The second is that the interactions are characterized by leader/follower assymetries wherein industry leaders expect accommodation from their competitors while followers behave as Cournot players.

Business, Business enterprises, Oligopolies

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Entry, exit and establishment survival in UK manufacturing

Article Abstract:

UK manufacturing firms are studied from 1986 to 1991. Business survival depends upon size, age and operation of the firm.

United Kingdom, Organizational history, Science & research, Manufacturing industry, Manufacturing industries, Business success, Organization formation, Organization dissolution

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