Reinterpreting the kernel

Article Abstract:

A reinterpretation of the kernel of a transferable utility game was effected through the development of new thorems which separated the dependence of the solution on interpersonal comparisons of utility. Application of the reduced game/non-cooperative model to general coalitional games yielded stationary equilibria, as in the Nash solution for pure bargaining problems. The new theorems are based on the prekernel being obtained as a set of payoffs where the relevant bargaining range between pair of players is split in half.

Game theory

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Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem

Article Abstract:

The double implementation by a simple quantity game form was developed as a means of constructing desirable game forms which implements efficient solution in the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium. A strong advantage of the technique is the ability of the designer to separate the complete information assumption from the model, as well as the ability to use the model in the mixed strategy equilibria through the Pareto dominance criteria which renders some qualification in the domains of economies.

Mathematical optimization, Optimization theory

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Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination

Article Abstract:

'Non-exclusive conventions' and 'local interaction among individual agents' parameters were incorporated into the economic interaction model to test interaction conditions in communities with different conventions. Results show that interaction approaches equilibrium only if Pareto-efficient conventions are achieved through local interaction and lower associated costs for flexibility. The interaction was also shown to be affected by community size.

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