Renegotiation design with multiple regulators

Article Abstract:

The presence of multi-principal agents relationships is a compelling feature of the internal organization of governments. A study investigated this selected organizational structure and related issues. These issues include the factors behind this particular decentralization of powers, why regulators frequently have biased and limited objectives that differ from social welfare maximization, and the cost/benefits of the separation of regulators.

Other General Government Support, Government Organization, Executive, Legislative, and Other General Government Support, Government Regulation, Agencies-Administrative, Regulatory Costs & Benefits, Political aspects, Independent regulatory commissions, Administrative agencies, Government agencies, Regulatory compliance costs, Agency theory, Public administration, Organization, Business-government relations

---

Strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts corrigendum

Article Abstract:

Bunching takes place in equilibrium if certain boundary conditions related to adverse selection are considered. For unilateral intervention, bunching takes place on a subset of types. It also takes place during bilateral intervention but assumes a different form. Asymmetric equilibria exists if the government provides either a comprehensive pooling contract or a fully separating contract.

Interpretation and construction, Economic aspects, Trade policy, Commercial policy, Intervention (Federal government), Federal intervention, Equilibrium (Economics), Public contracts, Government contracts

---

Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions

Article Abstract:

The rates of information aggregation in common value auctions are investigated under the information structures formulated in Wilson, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (PS) in order to compare the asymptotic properties of prices across different auction forms. The result reflects the differing strategic considerations facing bidders in the Wilson and PS sequences of auctions.

Pricing Policy, Models, Pricing, Information management, Product price, Information accessibility

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Wage negotiations under two-sided incomplete information with the possibility of side contracts. James Watt as intellectual monopolist: comment on Boldrin and Levine
• Abstracts: Organization design and information-sharing in a research joint venture with spillovers. Growth regressions and what the textbooks don't tell you
• Abstracts: Oligopoly with asymmetric information: differentiation in credit markets. Welfare effects of changes in environmental quality under individual uncertainty about use
• Abstracts: Restructuring, competition and regulatory reform in the U.S. electricity sector. An interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading
• Abstracts: Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information. Search, evolution, and money

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.