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Starting small and renegotiation

Article Abstract:

A study examined how partners progress from a state of uncertainty about each other until they become confident in each other such that a long-term partnership between them is possible. This phenomenon of gradualism or 'starting small' was investigated by developing and analyzing a set of dynamic games with variable stakes. The games describe a dynamic interaction where the two partners can unitedly select from a plethora of projects over time while autonomously deciding if they want to cooperate at every instant. An equilibrium where the partners 'start small' was found to be uniquely selected by a robust renegotiation condition.

Author: Watson, Joel
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1999
Analysis, Partnership, Partnerships, Negotiation, Negotiations, Strategic alliances (Business), Information theory, Interorganizational relations, Uncertainty, Information theory in economics

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Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms

Article Abstract:

A dominance theory called conditional dominance is proposed to examine extensive form rationalizability in general games. The aim is to prove that extensive form rationalizability and iterated conditional dominance are equivalent under appropriate conditions. This equivalence is attributed in part to the assumption that the consistency of players' conjectures is not relevant to the concept of rationalizability. It is also demonstrated that the set of extensive form rationalizable strategies can be determined using simple linear programming methods.

Author: Watson, Joel, Shimoji, Makoto
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1998
Econometrics & Model Building, Econometrics, Game theory, Rational expectations (Economics), Business models

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Evidence disclosure and verifiability

Article Abstract:

The study explores the motion of 'verifiability' by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in contractual relationships with complete information. This analysis characterizes the implementability in terms of the existence and form of 'hard evidence'.

Author: Watson, Joel, Bull, Jesse
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities, Rules of Evidence, Evidence (Law), Economic theory

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Subjects list: Models, Economics
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