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Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real investment options

Article Abstract:

Convertible bonds are used by companies to resolve problems associated with sequential-financing. The option part of convertible bonds tends to limit overinvestment incentive and serves as a hedge against costs related with future capital increase. Its call provision, meanwhile, is proved to be useful in dealing with uncertainty associated with real option's maturity date. It also permits companies to continue their financing plan that is not affected by the debt issue.

Author: Mayers, David
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1998
Security brokers and dealers, Securities and Commodity Contracts Intermediation and Brokerage, Securities & Investment Svcs, Usage, Securities, Convertible bonds, Preferred stocks, Investment services

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Guaranty funds and risk-taking: evidence from the insurance industry

Article Abstract:

Property-liability insurers showed a propensity to shift their asset portfolios to stocks instead of bonds in cases of guaranty-fund enactments. This action is correlated with the risk-subsidy hypothesis where the structure of guaranty-funds provides rewards for risk-taking in an insurer's investment activities. Guaranty-fund enactments serve as a form of secure environment since the incentives are concentrated in a single region.

Author: Smith, Clifford W., Jr., Mayers, David, Lee, Soon-Jae
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1997
Insurance, Insurance Carriers and Related Activities, Administration of General Economic Programs, INSURANCE CARRIERS, Investment Incentives & Guarantees, Insurance industry, Investments, Portfolio management, Investment incentives

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Manegerial vote ownership and shareholder wealth: evidence from employee stock ownership plans

Article Abstract:

An investigation of employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) announcements led to the conclusion that shareholders benefit when managers control up to 20% of the shares, but lose out when managers control less than 10% or more than 20% of the shares.

Author: Mayers, David, Saeyoung Chang
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1992
Employee stock ownership plans

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Subjects list: Research, Analysis
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