A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence

Article Abstract:

The prisoner's dilemma is shown to be a powerful tool when used to deter collusion between two supervisors with the same information. A hierarchy formed by a principal, a supervisor and an agent is examined. It is demonstrated that the principal can deter collusion by introducing a second supervisor although it could prove to be too costly. It is concluded that under reasonable assumptions on the size of rewards and punishment, the principal can prevent collusion only by 'creating' a new type of supervisor by sometimes informing the second supervisor of his position, making bribing unprofitable for the agent.

Research, Usage, Social hierarchies, Prisoner's dilemma game

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Notes on bribery and the control of corruption

Article Abstract:

Standard models of corruption assume that a bribe-taking decision depends on the size of the penalty for bribe-taking relative to that of the criminal's bribe. However, if caught taking the bribe, the individual may also offer the apprehending agent a similar bribe, and the second law enforcer is subject to the same constraints as the first. The size of the offical penalty for bribe-taking thus determines the equilibrium amount of the bribe. A standard Nash solution suggests that corruption control depends on the incidence of corruption, the size of the auditing force, and auditor incentives.

Economic aspects, Police corruption, Recursion theory

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Corruption in tax administration

Article Abstract:

An analysis of corrupt practices in tax administration and procedure is presented. The analysis extends the range of an earlier game-theoretic model to consider such corruption. It is shown that corruption generates higher auditing rates compared to conditions in its absence. Moreover, corrupt settings still allow the possibility of attaining equilibrium conditions where all returns are audited.

Tax administration and procedure, Tax administration, Ethical aspects

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