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Bureaucrats and tax limitation

Article Abstract:

Welfare effects and voting on tax limitation are examined. Tax limitation allows voters to keep taxation to a certain maximum level. A model is constructed to analyze the costs and benefits of tax limitation given a monopoly tax bureau. In the initial case, tax limitation increases voter welfare. An extension to the case wherein the bureau acts to prevent tax limitation by softening its monopoly stance is made. In this scenario, voters may fail to impose a tax limitation not only because of the bureau's actions, but also because voter heterogeneity may fail to produce a consensus on the optimal tax limit. Conditions under which tax limitation is successfully imposed are derived. Future research concerns include voters' transaction costs, the free-rider problem, regulation and principal-agent concerns that arise from, and imperfect information that limits, the tax limitation analysis.

Author: Lee, Kangoh
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 1993
Voting, Tax and expenditure limitations

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Tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to examine the impact of imperfectly mobile capital on tax competition using a two-period, two-jurisdiction model. In the first period, there is perfect mobility of capital between jurisdictions. In the second period, however, there is a transaction cost involved, which is employed in the first period by one jurisdiction and, if sufficient enough, hampers capital movement. As a result of the imperfect mobility of capital, there may be an overprovision instead of underprovision of public goods in the latter period. Jurisdictions may be compelled to compete more fiercely for capital in the initial period. This study was intended as a relevant framework for research on tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital.

Author: Lee, Kangoh
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 1997
Taxation, Capital movements

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An economic analysis of public school choice plans

Article Abstract:

This article discusses the relationship between school choice, competition, open enrollment, and school quality. Topics include state aid to education, social welfare, and economic analysis.

Author: Lee, Kangoh
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Urban Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0094-1190
Year: 1997
Elementary and secondary schools, Public Schools, Analysis, School, Choice of, School choice, Open plan schools, Open education

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Subjects list: Economic aspects, Research
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