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Double inefficiency in optimally organized firms

Article Abstract:

An analysis of production efforts done in groups is presented. Team production often results in negligent behavior on the part of members, resulting in inefficiencies characterized by low productivity and decreased incomes. In addition, uncertainty may prompt management to make certain adjustments that could create additional inefficiencies. Results show the reinforcement between the two inefficiencies when output variance decreases in the number of team members. An increasing output variance in the number of team members results in opposing inefficiencies.

Author: Bos, Dieter, Peters, Wolfgang
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1995
All Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing, Manufacturing industries, not elsewhere classified, Manufacturing Industries NEC, Manufacturing industry, Manufacturing industries, Economic aspects, Work groups, Teamwork (Workplace), Production (Economics)

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Mass privatization, management control and efficiency

Article Abstract:

A model can be used to determine how many shareholders a former state-owned firm is to have. Mass privatization is used when the incumbent manager's utility enters the political support function with greater significance than the well-being of possible shareholders. The myth that mass privatization plans sacrifice efficiency for the sake of politics is proven wrong by the achievements of a pareto-optimal allocation.

Author: Bos, Dieter, Harms, Phillipp
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1997
Other General Government Support, Stockholder Relations, National Government Enterprises, Stockholders, Privatization, Privatization (Business), Government business enterprises, Public enterprises, Investor relations, Government ownership, Nationalization

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Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

Article Abstract:

A contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution are explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. In an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement.

Author: Bos, Dieter, Kolmar, Martin
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2003
United States, Welfare economics, Contractarianism

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Subjects list: Research, Analysis
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