Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Government

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Government

Investment in local public services: Nash equilibrium and social optimum

Article Abstract:

The ideal conditions of a local public good which are inseparable and which create interjurisdictional overflows are studied in the context of a two-community setting. Results from the Nash equilibrium are compared with a first-best solution based on a Benthamian welfare function. Analysis indicates that social optimality can be possible in the context of a Nash equilibrium despite the absence of government intervention through the implementation of matching grants.

Author: Cremer, Helmuth, Pestieau, Pierre, Marchand, Maurice
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1997
Research, Public goods, Welfare economics, Equilibrium (Economics)

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending

Article Abstract:

Incompetency in the level and pattern of public expenditure arises whenever fiscal competition becomes uncoordinated. Overprovision of public inputs or underprovision of articles related to direct consumption benefits results whenever a nation engages in unilateral enhancement of public inputs provision. A decline in the public provision of local public goods assisting immobile consumers also affects public expenditure.

Author: Keen, Michael, Marchand, Maurice
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1997
Public investments, Expenditures, Public, Public expenditures

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


The value of explicit randomization in the tax code

Article Abstract:

The integration of explicit randomization into the tax code results to improvement in tax collection and elimination of tax evasion. A simple stylized model of tax evasion shows that explicit randomization forces people to reveal their actual income under optimal policies. Such measure also decreases costs associated with tax auditing and permits greater utilization of taxes to attain social goals.

Author: Pestieau, Pierre, Slutsky, Steven M., Possen, Uri M.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1998
Tax Law, Public Finance Activities, Models, Tax research, Tax collection, Taxpayer compliance

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Economics, Economic aspects
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality. Implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
  • Abstracts: House prices and the provision of local public services: Capitalization under school choice programs. School finance, spatial income segregation, and the nature of communities
  • Abstracts: Competition between private and public schools: testing stratification and pricing predictions. School vouchers in practice: competition will not hurt you
  • Abstracts: Toilet cleaning and department chairing: volunteering a public service. Volunteering a public service: an experimental investigation
  • Abstracts: Congestion, land use, and job dispersion: a general equilibrium model. Income distribution and the residential density gradient
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2025 Advameg, Inc.