Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Government

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Government

Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality

Article Abstract:

A two-stage game in which club size is resolved internally is applied to assess the non-cooperative characteristic of public goods. The effects of alternative fiscal policies on Nash equilibrium is also evaluated using simple instruments. Results indicate that pooled amounts of money in the form of grants can be used the optimal equal treatment allocation when agents do not obtain non-fiscal gains from volunteer work. Simple fiscal instruments are found not to be able to fulfill the optimal equal-treatment allocation if club size is not directly controlled.

Author: Pestieau, Pierre, Boadway, Robin, Marchand, Maurice, Barham, Vicky
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1997
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Economic aspects, Fiscal policy, Clubs, Clubs (Associations)

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


The uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods: an alternative proof

Article Abstract:

An analysis of Nash equilibrium conditions is presented. The analysis focuses on the unique character of Nash equilibrium under conditions where public goods are distributed in private provision. It is shown that earlier studies which concluded on such equilibrium settings generated opaque conclusions. In addition, current research indicates an important assumption in the willingness of all individuals in the economy to finance public good.

Author: Fraser, Clive D.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1992

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

Article Abstract:

The Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium is considered with regard to the incentive aspect.

Author: Tian, Guoqiang
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 2000

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Research, Public goods, Equilibrium (Economics)
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: Theory and application of linear supply function equilibrium in electricity markets. Household response to optional peak-load pricing of electricity
  • Abstracts: Service efforts and accomplishments reporting in local government. 2001 CFO survey - a preview: electronic government
  • Abstracts: Commutes, quits, and moves. Compensation for commutes in labor and housing markets. Race and commutes
  • Abstracts: Selection bias and land development in the monocentric city model. Urban land value functions with endogenous zoning
  • Abstracts: Regions, the dollar, and reindustrialization. Supply-side regional economics. Causes of changes in wage variation among states
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2025 Advameg, Inc.