On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies

Article Abstract:

Linear tax-subsidy policies in a simple one-shot game of voluntary contributions prove to be ineffective in enacting an efficient provision of a public good. In policies where individual taxes rely on the sum of all other individuals' contributions, achievement of an efficient provision will always remain impossible except if the government has sufficient information on individual characteristics. In policies where taxes rely on the distribution of contributions, the uniqueness of equilibrium supply of the public good is inexistent.

Tax Law, Public Finance Activities, Analysis, Public goods, Tax expenditures

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Can by-product lobbying firms compete?

Article Abstract:

The free rider problem can be tackled through a by-product company selling private goods for profit to interest group members, using funds raised for lobbying, according to Olsen. The validity of this model is explored, using a monpolistic competition model.

Externalities (Economics), Monopolistic competition

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Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Article Abstract:

Lobbying is explored using an experiment involving a common agency game with two equilibria. The concepts of a truthful and a natural equilibrium are also explored.

Equilibrium (Economics)

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