Market power and the National Association of Attorneys General Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Article Abstract:

The National Assn of Attorneys General, with a membership of state and regional officials, adopted Horizontal Merger Guidelines on Mar 10, 1987, delineating enforcement policy on horizontal mergers. The guidelines lack the force of law, but are based on Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Their main purpose is to prevent companies from attaining market power. Mergers are held to facilitate the exercise of this power, so the guidelines deal with the competitive results of mergers. They differ in several respects from the 1984 Merger Guidelines of the US Department of Justice.

Market share, National Association of Attorneys General

---

The growing judicial acceptance of the merger guidelines

Article Abstract:

The courts have consistently shown a willingness to consider the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines since their first promulgation in 1968, although they have not accorded them the force of law. The guidelines are useful to the business world in analyzing the legality of the business decisions they are contemplating. Ease of entry and the analysis of anticompetitive conduct are two aspects of the guidelines which need additional clarification. More than 75 cases and 28 requests for preliminary injunctions have based some of their arguments on the guidelines.

United States. Department of Justice. Antitrust Division

---

Merger analysis in the '90s: the guidelines and beyond - a former enforcer's perspective

Article Abstract:

The 1992 Merger Guidelines are more analytical than the 1982 and 1984 versions and should provide more complete guidance for adjudications before agencies and the courts. The structure of the 1992 guidelines focuses on the reason for the guidelines, determining whether a proposed merger would be anticompetitive, and analyses the various issues in terms of their competitive impact. Applying the Guidelines may be easier because of the greater logical flow and connections made among the various issues.

Unfair competition (Commerce), Unfair competition

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Market power as a screen in evaluating horizontal restraints. The reform of the European competition policy concerning vertical restraints
• Abstracts: The view from the Summit: jurisdiction and beyond. 60 minutes with Robert M. Langer, chair, National Association of Attorneys General Multistate Antitrust Task Force
• Abstracts: Predation and multiproduct firms: an economic appraisal of the Sievers-Albery results. Strategic allocation of overhead: the application of traditional predation tests to multiproduct firms

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.