Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

Article Abstract:

Nash equilibrium in an n-person game can be achieved if several conditions are present. These conditions include what the players know and believe about the game and their opponents' rationality, actions and knowledge and beliefs. Recent research has shown that common knowledge plays a smaller role in characterizing Nash equilibrium than has previous assumed. Nash equilibrium in n-person games cannot occur when n is less than or equal to 3, despite the existence of common prior, mutual knowledge of payoff functions and rationality.

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Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests

Article Abstract:

An analysis of reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games is presented. The analysis assumes the presence of conflicting interests and focuses on a two-person game. It is shown that the game generates such conflictwhen one player's minimax payoff is reduced by planned strategy of the other. Adiscount factor which is close to one settles a commitment payoff under Nash equilibrium conditions.

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Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games

Article Abstract:

An evolutionary model describing learning, mutations and long run equilibria under game conditions is presented. Analysis shows that strategic expansion and contraction is related to their current relative success, despite the presence of mutations. These mutations influence the equilibrium set and limit it to long-run equilibria conditions. Several symmetric assumptions satisfy risk-dominance standards.

Learning models (Stochastic processes), Stochastic models

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