Anderson on reason and value

Article Abstract:

Elizabeth Anderson's two arguments against consequentialist ideas on reason and value are wrong. The first argument regarding rationality is based on coherent narrative unity. It stems from her defective perception of the forward looking doctrine of consequentialism and a confusion between consequentialists and economists. Attribution of intrinsic values to persons invariably entails an involvement into the state of affairs. Hence the second argument that consequentialism attributes intrinsic values to the state of affairs, instead of persons, is defective.

Reason

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Making sense of value

Article Abstract:

Elizabeth Anderson's criteria of expressive norms for making sense of value is irrelevant to a person's rationality. According to her rational attitude theory of value, something is valuable if it makes sense for someone to value it and the expression of such valuations require shared social norms. To describe something or someone as valuable is to describe it or the person as rational. To judge something as valuable is to have a complex attitude towards the object of valuation.

Ethical aspects, Social norms

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Does consequentialism make too many demands, or none at all?

Article Abstract:

Consequentialism is argued to be a theory of exacting moral standards but not of decisive reasons for agents to conform to these standards. Without augmentation, consequentialism is not simply a theory of exact standards but a theory of consequentialist moral reasons, a theory on which consequentialism makes demands on agents to meet its exacting moral standards.

Morality

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