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Philosophy and religion

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The subjectivity of welfare

Article Abstract:

An adequate theory of well-being or welfare must be subjective rather than objective. A subjective theory is one that relates well-being to the attitudes or concerns of the subject. This subject-relativity distinguishes the prudential value associated with well-being from other forms of value, such as aesthetic, perfectionist or ethical value. Problems with the two major objectivist theories, those based on concepts of private ownership and teleology, support the argument that welfare is subjective. Private ownership fails to connect ethical and prudential values, while teleological theory fails to distinguish prudential value from perfectionist value.

Author: Sumner, L.W.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1995
Canada, Subjectivity

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Honoring and promoting values

Article Abstract:

Philip Pettit has suggested that ethical theories can be distinguished by their recommended response to values. Consequentialism requires that values be promoted, whereas deontology favors honoring values over promoting them. However, Pettit's distinction does not work as well as the standard contrast between agent-neutral and agent-relative theories. For one thing, not all values can be honored; happiness is a particularly important example. Pettit's account also fails to cover all the points of contrast between the two theories and distorts the deontological conception of duty.

Author: McNaughton, David, Rawling, Piers
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1992
Analysis, Consequentialism (Ethics), Deontic logic

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Plural values and indeterminate rankings

Article Abstract:

Value rankings may be determinate, indeterminate or incommensurate. In a determinate ranking of A and B, either they are equal or one is better than the other. In incommensurate ranking, A and B's value cannot be compared because they have no commonality. Ranking of A and B is indeterminate if each possible ranking is equally reasonable. The indeterminate model is the most adequate to represent the complexity of moral decisions. Maturity in individuals and societies is characterized by an increase in the use of indeterminate rather than determinate models of decision-making.

Author: Seung, T.K., Bonevac, Daniel
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Ethics
Subject: Philosophy and religion
ISSN: 0014-1704
Year: 1992
Methods, Decision making, Decision-making (Ethics)

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Subjects list: Beliefs, opinions and attitudes, Values, Values (Philosophy)
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