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The self-regulation of commodity exchanges: the case of market manipulation

Article Abstract:

Review of self-regulation efforts in commodities markets before laws were enacted to restrict market manipulation reveals that claims that self-regulation is both efficient and effective are unfounded. In the environment prior to federal regulation, self-regulation enforcement was very limited. Exchange members did not have the economic incentive to self-regulate because much of the harm done by market manipulation was done to marginal participants. It was also evident that exchange members had disincentives to act collectively, particularly when they were rent-seeking.

Author: Pirrong, Stephen Craig
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Journal of Law and Economics
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0022-2186
Year: 1995
United States, Commodity exchanges, Industry self-regulation, Industry self regulation

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An application of core theory to the analysis of ocean shipping markets

Article Abstract:

Competition or its absence in ocean shipping markets is explained by core theory which focuses on demand and cost factors. The theory holds that indivisible costs plus divisible demands work against equilibrium or the distribution of resources by competition. The collusion in ocean liner markets fits a pattern of indivisible costs and divisible demands, while the competition in bulk shipping exists with indivisible demands.

Author: Pirrong, Stephen Craig
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Journal of Law and Economics
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0022-2186
Year: 1992
Competition (Economics), Shipping industry

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Refusing to cooperate with competitors: a theory of boycotts

Article Abstract:

A mathematical model can describe the value of using boycotts as a tool to delay a competitor's entry to a market. The model uses a market of differentiated products, variable consumer preferences, repeat business and intertemporal demand. The success of a boycott varies with the extent of each condition, but a boycott can succeed using the tactic of noncooperation with competitors.

Author: Brennan, Timothy J.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Journal of Law and Economics
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0022-2186
Year: 1992
Barriers to entry (Industrial organization), Barriers to entry, Boycotts

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Subjects list: Economic aspects
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