| Journal of Economic Theory 1999 |
| Title | Subject | Authors |
|---|
| Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information. | Economics | Antonio Cabrales |
| A general extension theorem for binary relations. | Economics | John Duggan |
| A model of optimal growth strategy. | Economics | Cuong Le Van, Philippe Askenazy |
| An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations. | Economics | James Bergin, John Duggan |
| A note on Matsushima's regularity condition.(Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Kim-Sau Chung |
| A note on the optimal structure of production. | Economics | J.M. Da Rocha, De Frutos M. Angeles |
| A revelation principle for competing mechanisms. | Economics | Larry G. Epstein, Michael Peters |
| A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. | Economics | Tayfun Sonmez, Michel Balinski |
| A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands. | Economics | Brett Katzman |
| Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods. | Economics | Rajat Deb, Laura Razzolini |
| A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good.(Notes, Comments and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Takehiko Yamato, Tatsuyoshi Saijo |
| Bargaining, production, and monotonicity in economic environments. | Economics | Mark A. Chen, Eric S. Maskin |
| Boundary behavior of excess demand and existence of equilibrium.(Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Farhad Husseinov |
| Chaotic learning equilibria. | Economics | Martin Schonhofer |
| Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model. | Economics | Jorgen W. Weibull, Maria Saez-Marti |
| Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information. | Economics | Piero Gottardi, Alberto Bisin |
| Complementarity between import competition and import promotion. | Economics | Hamid Beladi, Sugata Marjit |
| Conflict and distribution. | Economics | Joan Esteban, Debraj Ray |
| Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents. | Economics | Carlos Alos-Ferrer |
| Efficiency in sequential partnerships. | Economics | Roland Strausz |
| Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive. | Economics | Uzi Segal, Louis Makowski, Joseph M. Ostroy |
| Endogenous fluctuations in a bounded rationality economy: learning non-perfect foresight equilibria. | Economics | Emilio Barucci, Laura Gardini, Gian Italo Bischi |
| Endogenous vs exogenously driven fluctuations in vintage capital models. | Economics | Raouf Boucekkine, Omar Licandro, Fernando del Rio |
| Experimentation, imitation, and stochastic stability. | Economics | Douglas Gale, Robert W. Rosenthal |
| Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes. | Economics | Donald G. Saari |
| Far-sightedness and the voting paradox.(Notes, Comments and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Bhaskar Chakravorti |
| Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids. | Economics | Zvika Neeman, Gerhard O. Orosel |
| Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games. | Economics | Marciano Siniscalchi, Pierpaolo Battigalli |
| House allocation with existing tenants. | Economics | Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tayfun Sonmez |
| Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough. | Economics | Sandro Brusco |
| Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core. | Economics | Rajiv Vohra |
| Innovation, growth, and welfare-improving cycles. | Economics | Patrick Francois, Shouyong Shi |
| Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: some possibility results. | Economics | Martin van Hees |
| Limit laws for non-additive probabilities and their frequentist interpretation. | Economics | Massimo Marinacci |
| Markets for composite goods. | Economics | Yves Balasko |
| Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games. | Economics | Subir K. Chakrabarti |
| Multi-commodity consumer search. | Economics | J. Rupert J. Gatti |
| Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities. | Economics | Ennio Stacchetti, Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu |
| Notes on sequence economies, transaction costs, and uncertainty. | Economics | Kenneth J. Arrow, Frank Hahn |
| On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games. | Economics | Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber |
| On interdependent supergames: multimarket contact, concavity and collusion. | Economics | Giancarlo Spagnolo |
| On optimal replacement thresholds with technological expectations. | Economics | Laura J. Kornish |
| On renegotiation-proof collusion under imperfect public information. | Economics | Kiho Yoon |
| On the communication complexity of expected-profit maximization. | Economics | J.S. Jordan, Dingbo Xu |
| On the different notions of arbitrage and existence of equilibrium. | Economics | Rose-Anne Dana, Cuong Le Van, Francois Magnien |
| On the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner-take-all games. | Economics | Suzanne Scotchmer, Eddie Dekel |
| Optimal central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. | Economics | Fernando Zapatero, Abel Cadenillas |
| Optimal consumption and portfolio selection with stochastic differential utility. | Economics | Mark Schroder, Costis Skiadis |
| Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions. | Economics | Mark Armstrong |
| Optimal saving under Poisson uncertainty. | Economics | Klaus Walde |
| Partially informative signalling. | Economics | Tommy Stamland |
| Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium. | Economics | Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eddie Dekel |
| Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model. | Economics | Joseph M. Ostroy, William R. Zame, Neil E. Gretsky |
| Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games. | Economics | Gerhard Sorger, Josef Holfbauer |
| Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games. | Economics | Murali Agastya |
| Price-independent welfare prescriptions and population size.(response to article by K. Roberts, J. Public Econ., p. 277, vol. 13, 1980) | Economics | Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, David Donaldson |
| Rationality and the LeChatelier principle.(Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Kevin Roberts |
| Rationing a commodity along fixed paths. | Economics | Herve Moulin |
| R&D cooperation and growth.(industrial research and development) | Economics | Guido Cozzi |
| Real business cycles, investment finance, and multiple equilibria. | Economics | Brian Hillier, Jonathan Rougier |
| Renegotiation design with multiple regulators. | Economics | David Martimort |
| Reputation versus social learning. | Economics | Matthew O. Jackson, Ehud Kalai |
| Sequential moves and tacit collusion: reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly.(Notes, Comments and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Klaus Wallner |
| Simple pareto-improving policies.(response to article by P. Diamond and J. Mirrlees, Am. Econ. Rev., p. 8, vol 61, 1971) | Economics | Michael Mandler |
| Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods. | Economics | Parimal Kanti Bag, Eyal Winter |
| Starting small and renegotiation. | Economics | Joel Watson |
| Stochastic OLG models, market structure and optimality. | Economics | Piero Gottardi, Subir Chattopadhyay |
| Stochastic revealed preference and the theory of demand. | Economics | Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Indraneel Dasgupta |
| The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games. | Economics | Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz |
| The congruence axiom and path independence. | Economics | Kunal Sengupta, Taradas Bandyopadhyay |
| The decomposition of risk in denumerable populations with ex ante identical individuals. | Economics | Guillaume Rabault |
| The optimal design of a market. | Economics | Matthew O. Jackson, Sandro Brusco |
| The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs. | Economics | Michael Suk-Young Chwe |
| The relationship between two dual methods of comparative statics.(Notes, Comments and Letters to the Editor) | Economics | Michael R. Caputo |
| Three methods to share joint costs or surplus. | Economics | Eric Friedman, Herve Moulin |
| Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information. | Economics | Stefan Krasa |
| Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. | Economics | Faruk Gul, Ennio Staccheti |
| Wealth effects in the principle agent model. | Economics | Achim Wambach, Henrik Thiele |
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